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ABSTRACT: Epistemic contextualism in the works of S. Cohen, K. DeRose, D. Lewis 
and others amounts to the semantic thesis that the truth conditions of knowledge 
attributions or denials vary according to the contextually shifting standards for 
knowledge attributions and to the indexical character of the predicate “knows”. 
This semantic variation is primarily due to the pragmatic features of the attribu-
tor context, depending on “what is at stake” for the attributor. In this paper con-
textualism is confronted with some invariantist objections. These objections are 
supported, first, by the considerations of the alleged, but indeed not purely the 
semantic or meta-linguistic character of the main contextualist theses: it is ar-
gued that contextualism unavoidably descend to the object level, making certain 
substantive claims about knowledge, and that the ambiguous evidence of con-
textualist thought-experiments make the truth-oriented or intellectualist invari-
antist alternative a more plausible and more coherent view. Secondly, they are 
supported by the well-known empirical evidence from cognitive psychology by 
e.g. P. Wason, P. Johnson-Laird, D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, A. Tversky as well as 
by P. Cheng, J. Holland, K. Holyoak, R. Nisbett and P. Thagard. Those findings 
demonstrated that in various contexts people mostly do not reason according to 
logical or probabilistic rules, but according to some contextually convenient rea-
soning patterns, the reliance on which may lead to systematic logical or probabil-
istic errors. Their inferential performance has been obviously assessed according 
to the logical or probabilistic rules as invariant standards for the attribution of 
logical or probabilistic knowledge. Accordingly, it is argued in this paper that the 
change of truth conditions and truth values of respective inferential knowledge 
attributions or denials is sensitive to the changing facts in the subject context, and 
may not be explained by the shifting standards for knowledge attributions. These 
standards remain the same across the contexts even when practices in different 
contexts in fact follow some other reasoning rules (e.g. pragmatic reasoning sche-
mas or heuristics). So, the varying truth conditions of the knowledge attributions 
in such cases depend only on the variations in the subject context.
KEY WORDS: Contextualism, inferential knowledge, invariantism, knowledge attri-
butions, psychology of reasoning.
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I. Introduction: contextualism vs. invariantism
The proponents of the so-called attributor contextualism in epistemology 
(hereafter: contextualism) like S. Cohen (1998, 1999, 2005), K. DeRose 
(1992, 1995, 2002, 2005, 2009), M. Heller (1999), D. Lewis (1996), and 
others, maintain that the contents and the truth-values of knowledge claims, 
knowledge ascribing or knowledge denying sentences, vary contextually 
in dependence of the contextually shifting standards for knowledge at-
tributions. According to contextualism, the truth conditions of knowledge 
claims are sensitive to the context of the knowledge attributor, i.e. to the 
context in which knowledge claims are uttered. So, the truth-conditions 
of knowledge claims depend on standards or facts in the context in which 
these attributions are made. According to some contextualists, for exam-
ple, according to S. Cohen (2005), it implies also that whether the knowl-
edge claims “S knows that p” or “S does not know that p” are true or not 
depends on the features of the attributor context. So, whether a subject has 
a strong or a weak epistemic position toward p depends on whether high 
or low standards for epistemic claims are applied. But for contextualists 
that does not mean that these standards are invariantly epistemic in char-
acter or that they are straightforward knowledge standards: they function 
primarily as the conversational norms for the correct use of the predi-
cate “knows” in respective conversational contexts, the contexts in which 
epistemic claims are made. “Knows” appears to be context sensitive like 
indexical terms “I” or “now”. Applying D. Kaplan’s (1989a, b) distinc-
tion concerning indexicals, contextualists maintain that the character or 
linguistic meaning of “knows” stays the same, but its content varies con-
textually. Consequently, when their context changes, knowledge claims 
change their contents, which are their respective propositions.
Some contextualists, DeRose and Cohen notably, claim also that the 
contextual variations of the contextual standards, which make “low stan-
dard” or “high standard” cases, depend on or are triggered by “what is at 
stake” in those contexts. It means that these standards are at the same time 
the functions of the salient pragmatic, non-objective and interest-related 
features of the context in which epistemic claims are uttered. According 
to Cohen (1999: 57) these pragmatic features include “the purposes, in-
tentions, expectations, presuppositions, etc., of the speakers who utter 
these sentences”. Contextualists find the supportive empirical evidence 
in the linguistic data provided by the contextual semantics of the verb 
“know” as well as in pragmatic assessments (in fictitious cases) of the 
believer’s epistemic position and the consequences of her beliefs in res-
pect to the overall practical situation in which the epistemic attributor is 
situated.
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For the purposes of this paper we will summarize and discuss con-
textualism as a conjunction of the following two theses:
(i)   the truth conditions and the truth values of knowledge claims as 
well as the semantic content of epistemic predicates like “knows” 
are sensitive and variable according to the context of the knowl-
edge attributor (hereafter: the semantic thesis), and 
(ii) these semantic variations depend on certain pragmatic features, 
i.e. on “what is at stake” in the attributor’s context (hereafter: the 
pragmatic thesis).
When discussing this simplified version of contextualism, which com-
prises both semantic and pragmatic theses, we are going to confront it with 
some non-skeptical invariantist objections. Under the label “invariantism” 
we adopt and adapt the minimal non-skeptical anti-contextualist strategy, 
analogous to the semantic position articulated by P. Unger (1984/2002). 
According to it, the relevant standards for epistemic claims do not vary 
contextually as epistemic contextualists maintain. Consequently, the 
truth-value of epistemic claims and the epistemic position of the subject 
are not dependent on the features of the attributor context. Certain invari-
antist arguments point to the epistemic relevance of the pragmatic features 
of the subject context and of “what is at stake” in the subject’s overall 
situation. These arguments come under the labels “subject-sensitive in-
variantism” by J. Hawthorne (2004) or “interest-relative invariantism” by 
J. Stanley (2005), having F. Dretske’s (2000) externalist analysis of “the 
pragmatic dimension of knowledge” as their important predecessor in that 
sense. However, we do not take this pragmatic line and state our argu-
ments in the purely truth-oriented or veritist terms: we consider knowl-
edge, roughly, as a state functionally dependent on some truth-conducive 
factors like the processes producing sound inferences or other (condition-
ally) reliable processes of belief production. So, applying Stanley’s (2005) 
and DeRose’s (2009) labeling, our position would be then approximate to 
“intelectualist” or “classical invariantism”.
Our invariantist objections to contextualism are grounded on our con-
siderations of some of the contextualist arguments together with the ficti-
tious cases and respective “intuitions” contextualists rely on. As it seems, 
our objections find also strong empirical evidence and a major metho-
dological support in the field whose cognitive standards actually favor a 
truth-oriented and invariantist approach. The evidence is for a long time at 
hand: it derives from the well-known empirical findings in cognitive psyc-
hology, e.g. in the works of P.Wason, P. Johnson-Laird, D. Kahneman, P. 
Slovic, A. Tversky, or P. Cheng, J. Holland, K. Holyoak, R. Nisbett, P. 
Thagard, and many others. We are trying to show, at least in a programma-
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tic way, that these results, which have already caused a tremendous impact 
in some philosophical areas, have significant bearings on the epistemic 
standards in general, especially concerning the status of claims attributing 
or denying inferential knowledge.
In that what follows we are trying to show why changing descriptive 
and invariant normative elements in inference practices and in their evalu-
ations are important for inferential knowledge and respective knowledge 
claims. Fictitious cases of ordinary situations designed to support con-
textualism are shown not to provide unambiguous evidence for contextu-
alism; moreover, slightly modified, they may be used equivalently as 
evidence for various kinds of epistemological invariantism. The upshot 
of our objections is that contextualism does not explain why reasoning 
subjects fail to have knowledge in the cases of fallacious reasoning and 
inferential ignorance described in psychological literature (like Wason’s 
selection task and the conjunction fallacy). As a preliminary, we are go-
ing to point to certain substantive features of contextualism, beyond the 
semantic or pragmatic domain. These features present contextualism as 
the position more susceptible to a criticism from an invariantist point of 
view.
II. Contextualism and knowledge attributions
The central phenomenon which contextualism is intended to “save”, i.e. 
to describe and explain adequately, is the existence of mutually exclu-
sive, but nonetheless true and legitimate epistemic claims (where p = S 
has hands, BIV = S is a brain in a vat), nicknamed by DeRose (1995) as 
an “abominable conjunction”, and construed as an argument for global 
skepticism:
(i)   S knows that p.
(ii)   If S knows that p, S knows that ¬BIV.
(iii) S does not know that ¬BIV
The common-sense realist accepts (i) and (ii), but not (iii), and the skeptic 
accepts (ii) and (iii), but not (i). However, the contextualist tries to recon-
cile these incompatible intuitions, maintaining that all these three claims 
are true, but in their own contexts. So, both “S knows that p” and “S does 
not know that p”, which is derived from (ii) and (iii), are true, according 
to respective standards for knowledge attributions and to the use of the 
predicate “knows”: the epistemic claim “S does not know that p” is true 
in the high-standards or skeptic context, while “S knows that p” is true in 
the low-standards or common-sense context. Due to the indexicality of 
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“knows”, however, here we do not have a contradiction, since “knows” as 
used by the skeptic and “knows” as used by the common-sense realist ex-
press different contents, different epistemic properties. Contextualism is, 
therefore, presented as a solution to the problem of skepticism because it 
provides “the best explanation” of the genuine phenomenon of incompat-
ible, but true epistemic claims.
Formulated at first as a response to global skepticism and brain-in-a-
vat scenarios, contextualism now appears as a universal, although, in it-
self, slightly diversified strategy for dealing with various epistemological 
problems and paradoxes, like the Lottery Paradox, the Epistemic Closure 
and the Gettier problem.1 Here, however, the focus is on the generalized 
contextualist strategy, which is not directed at solving the skeptical or any 
other specific problem as such, but to explaining the context sensitivity of 
knowledge claims in general. So, contextualists in general explain the dif-
ferences in epistemic positions of the same subjects across various attri-
butor contexts and due to the contextually shifting standards. Variations in 
the contexts of knowledge attributions and, consequently, in the epistemic 
position of the subject, follow the change of the conversational standards 
which govern the epistemic discourse.
The generalized contextualist strategy provides a finer gradation of 
various contexts and avoids extreme ranges of alternatives. Comparable 
to the case of incompatible, but true epistemic claims in the skeptical and 
non-skeptical contexts, contextualists, when distinguishing various con-
texts, similarly divide them into higher-standards contexts and lower-
standards contexts. However, since their Gedankenexperimente imitate 
ordinary situations, in which ordinary speakers make epistemic claims 
attributing or denying knowledge to ordinary subjects, communicated in 
ordinary language expressions, naturally, pragmatic features come to the 
fore.
Like in the widely discussed Bank Case (K. DeRose 1992, and later) 
and Airport Case (S. Cohen, 1999), this gradation depends on the pragma-
tic features of the attributor’s situation: the epistemic status of a believer 
is to be determined with respect to “what is at stake” in the conversational 
situation in which knowledge claims are made. So, the subject may know 
in a lower-standard context, when nothing vital is at stake, but fails to 
know in a higher-standard context, when ignorance could lead to some, 
say, financial disaster. Consider, for example, the Airport Case invented 
by S. Cohen (1999: 58):
1 This diversification sometimes leads to disagreement: for example, S. Cohen (1998) 
and M. Heller (1999), as opposed to D. Lewis (1996), maintain that the Gettier problem is 
not to be solved by the contextualist explanatory means.
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Mary and John are at the L.A airport contemplating taking a certain flight 
to New York. They want to know whether the flight has a layover in Chi-
cago. They overhear someone ask a passenger Smith if he knows whether 
the flight stops in Chicago. Smith looks at the flight itinerary he got from 
the travel agent and respond, “Yes I know–it does stop in Chicago.” It turns 
out that Mary and John have a very important business contact they have to 
make at the Chicago airport. Mary says, “How reliable is that itinerary? It 
could contain a misprint. They could have changed the schedule at the last 
minute.” Mary and John agree that Smith doesn’t really know that the plane 
will stop in Chicago. They decide to check with the airline agent.
So, “what is at stake” for knowledge attributors Mary and John proves 
epistemically relevant when Smith’s epistemic position is considered. Ob-
viously, nothing changed in the subject context; however, new practical 
features in the attributor context raise the standards for attributing knowl-
edge to the subject, so it seems to Mary and John that the claim “Smith 
knows that the flight stops in Chicago” is not true in this situation.
Such specific empirical or quasi-empirical findings based on the anal-
ysis of ordinary language utterances and epistemic “intuitions” are sup-
posed to support contextualism. However, variations of the same cases, 
introducing additional elements, make the cases more ambiguous, so their 
evidential status becomes more susceptible to different and rivalling “intu-
itions”. The variations of the cases invented for the contextualist purposes 
were used as evidence for their epistemological counterpart, interest-rela-
tive invariantism, as well. J. Stanley’s (2005: 3–6) variations of the Bank 
Case include various combinations of respective stakes (Low Stakes, High 
Stakes, Low Attributor-High Subject Stakes, Ignorant High Stakes, High 
Attributor – Low Subject Stakes) and without a clear cut divides between 
subject and attributor situations. In the case where attributor stakes are 
low, and subject stakes are high, attributor’s (Jill’s) relaxed claim that the 
subject (Hannah) knows that the bank will be open on Saturday is “intui-
tively” false (J. Stanley 2005: 4):
Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They 
plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit their pay checks. Since 
they have an impending bill coming due, and very little in their account, it 
is very important that they deposit their pay checks by Saturday. Two weeks 
earlier, on a Saturday, Hannah went to the bank, where Jill saw her. Sarah 
points out to Hannah that banks do change their hours. Hannah utters, “That’s 
a good point. I guess I don’t really know that the bank will be open on Sat-
urday”. Coincidentally Jill is thinking of going to the bank on Saturday, just 
for fun, to see if she meets Hannah there. Nothing is at stake for Jill, and she 
knows nothing of Hannah’s situation. Wondering whether Hannah will be 
there, Jill utters to a friend, “Well, Hannah was at the bank two weeks ago on 
a Saturday. So she knows the bank will be open on Saturday”.
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The attributor’s (Jill’s) claim attributing knowledge to the subject (Han-
nah) is false because it is not sensitive to the subject context and her practi-
cal interests. Were the situation in the subject context different and were 
the subject stakes lower, her epistemic claim would be, presumably, fol-
lowing Stanley’s argumentation, true. Therefore, the slight change in the 
Bank Case, made by introducing a relaxed knowledge attributor and rais-
ing the stakes for the subject, turns the case against contextualism and in 
favor of interest-relative invariantism.
However, similarly to the Airport Case and the contextualist reading 
of it, we encounter the problem of the relevance of the knowledge attri-
butor and of respective knowledge claims. So, we may pose a question, 
which is made from a trans-contextual perspective: “Why not, instead of 
Jill, to take Sarah to be the relevant attributor?” Or, in the Airport Case, 
“Why should we take Mary and John as relevant when Smith’s belief is 
considered? Why don’t we involve some trustworthy employee at the air-
port to check whether Smith knows?” In those revised situations we would 
have incompatible (Sarah’s vs. Jill’s) or possibly incompatible (an airport 
employee’s vs. Mary and John’s) epistemic claims. But, unlike the case 
of incompatible skeptical and common-sense epistemic claims, we wo-
uld have obviously a clear way out: we, outside the particular attributor 
contexts, could pick out the relevant knowledge attributor – Sarah and 
an airport employee. The truth values of the pertinent knowledge claims 
would then be based on truth-conducive elements, like the reliability and 
the trustworthiness of the attributor or the quality of evidence, and not on 
stakes. For there is nothing at stake for an airport employee, who is, on 
the other side, obviously a more reliable attributor; and Sarah, although 
pragmatically dependent on the epistemic position of Hannah, is primarily 
relevant because she is in a more vantage evidential position than Jill. 
This is the point in which an intellectualist contextualist (as DeRose 2009 
qualifies his position), and an intellectualist or classical invariantist could 
possibly agree in their “intuitions” on the cases.
But, at the same time the invariantist and the contextualist necessa-
rily disagree on the cases: while the contextualist explains the epistemic 
position of the subject in terms of the sensitivity to various contexts and 
various contextual standards, the intellectualist invariantist halts the sequ-
encing of contexts by making an attributor the relevant one and picking 
out the relevant standards and, therefore, uniquely determining the truth-
conditions of epistemic claims and the meanings of the epistemic predi-
cates.
The reason why the invariantist and contextualist interpretations of 
the cases are divergent may be of the methodological nature as well. The 
pragmatic considerations as well as the linguistic intuitions on ordinary 
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cases do their job in resolving the difficulties they are designed to resolve: 
primarily, to give a plausible explanation of the phenomenon of incompa-
tible, but allegedly true epistemic claims. However, the invariantist would 
contest this contextualist pretense to solve serious epistemological pro-
blems, like that of skepticism, by means of the semantic considerations on 
the meanings of epistemic terms and on the truth-values of the epistemic 
claims. As E. Sosa (2000) claimed, the problem of skepticism is not just 
a problem of the correct use of the epistemic predicates and cannot be 
solved on the meta-linguistic level. After all, the skeptic challenges co-
mmon-sense intuitions on knowledge on the object level, and therefore, 
needs an answer on the same level: it is not the question of the meaning of 
epistemic predicates, but of epistemic properties themselves.
However, as Cohen (1999) and DeRose (2009) rejoin, the semantic 
or meta-linguistic way is precisely the way out of the apparent paradox, 
which, according to their view, emerges on the “surface” of our ordinary 
epistemic claims, and should be resolved by semantic means. So, con-
textualism as an epistemological theory is not a theory of knowledge, but 
just a theory of knowledge attributions, a kind of semantic or meta-lingui-
stic theory aimed at resolving paradoxes which are produced by the use of 
the linguistic devices expressing epistemic properties on the level of the 
epistemic object language. In his overview P. Rysiew (2011) conveniently 
positioned contextualism among semantic theories, meaning that it does 
not deal with substantive epistemological questions. Thus DeRose (2009: 
21): the contextualism “is not a thesis about the structure of knowledge or 
justification”, but is neutral to any such theory. However, although it does 
not give a structural specification of what knowledge is, contextualism 
obviously implies something substantive about knowledge (DeRose 2002: 
168):
Contextualists hold that the truth conditions of knowledge-ascribing and 
knowledge-denying sentences (…) fluctuate in certain ways according to 
the context in which they are uttered. What so varies is the epistemic stan-
dards that S must meet (or in the case of a denial of knowledge, fail to meet) 
for such a statement to be true. In some contexts, “S knows that p” requires 
that S have a true belief that p and also be in a very strong epistemic position 
with respect to p, while in other contexts, the same sentence may require for 
its truth, in addition to S’s having a true belief that p, only that S meet some 
lower epistemic standards.
According to the proclaimed semantic character of contextualism, the 
predicate “being in a very strong epistemic position with respect to p” 
should be read as epistemically neutral. For it allows various independent, 
non-contextualist and substantive construals. Some contextualists them-
selves in their non-contextualist moments put forward such construals, 
389Z. ČULJAK / D. SEKULIĆ: Knowledge Attributions
like “being justified in believing that p” (by Cohen 1999) or “having a 
sensitive belief that p” (in the version by DeRose 1995, 2004), or “being in 
a position to exclude a relevant alternative to p” (by M. Heller 1999). But 
in the framework of contextualism as a theory of knowledge attributions, 
they restrain from these considerations. So, extending Kaplan’s distinc-
tion to the meaning of the knowledge claims, the claim “S knows that p” 
linguistically and invariantly means that S is in a good enough epistemic 
position with respect to p, but that how good this epistemic position must 
be for S to count as knowing that p contextually varies, and this is its vari-
able propositional content (DeRose 2009: 3). The question of content is, 
therefore, a substantive question: its solution does not lie within the scope 
of contextualism, because contextualists, by answering it, would commit 
the fallacy of “semantic descent” to the level of the object language, the 
language in which one talks directly about knowledge.
However, being indifferent as to what epistemic property is in que-
stion or what degree of its exemplification is sufficient for knowing, or 
what kind of epistemic position is denoted by this phrase, contextualism 
implies the fact that in any context there is an epistemic property exem-
plified in some degree and, therefore, that a subject occupies an epistemic 
position. It implies that, being the case that in different contexts different 
epistemic propositions are expressed, there is yet always some epistemic 
propositional content and epistemic property to be expressed. How ot-
herwise could the strength of the subject’s epistemic position be measured 
and graded as “strong” or “weak” if there would be nothing to measure 
and grade? DeRose (2009: 7) maintains that his concept of the strength of 
epistemic position is “entirely derivative from the concept of knowledge”, 
meaning that it does not provide any informative or non-circular explana-
tion of the knowledge concept itself:
To be in a strong epistemic position with respect to some proposition one 
believes is for one’s belief in that proposition to have to a high extent the 
property or properties the having enough of which is what’s needed for a true 
belief to constitute a piece of knowledge. (our emphasis)
Obviously, being in a strong epistemic position is a function of the needed 
epistemic property or properties exemplified by the pertinent belief to a 
sufficiently high extent. We are inclined to read this DeRose’s qualification 
as well as his statement that epistemic position derives from the concept 
of knowledge as substantive, at least in a modest or minimal sense of sup-
posing that the epistemic properties, which are necessary for knowledge, 
are in fact exemplified (in a non-skeptical context) or not exemplified (in 
the skeptical context). Although the content of the knowledge concept and 
required epistemic properties are not specified by DeRose, this minimal 
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substantive sense comes to the fore in DeRose’s quoted words (in italics), 
which emphasize factual belief’s having epistemic properties as constitu-
tive for knowledge.
If it is so, then the truth value of epistemic claims should be under-
stood as dependent on the subject’s epistemic position, which in turn su-
pervenes on the epistemic properties actually possessed by the belief in 
question. And since “S knows that p” is true if and only if p is true and S 
is in a sufficiently strong epistemic position, the truth values of epistemic 
claims would derive from the “correspondence” between epistemic propo-
sitions and the pertinent epistemic “facts” (or, if some other notion of truth 
is operative by contextualists, the truth values of epistemic claims would 
derive from some other, perhaps, conventionally based relation between 
those claims and epistemic “facts” as exemplified epistemic properties or 
some other epistemic “truthmakers”).
Of course, according to contextualism, the exemplification of episte-
mic properties is a matter of their attribution. Similarly, the truth value of 
epistemic claims is a matter of the attributed epistemic position according 
to the contextual standards. But then, reading these qualifications factu-
ally or realistically, as one obviously legitimately may do given the quoted 
sentences by DeRose, it would lead one to the idea that the contextually 
shifting standards and truth conditions of knowledge claims entail that 
the truth value of the epistemic claims changes. DeRose (2009) himself is 
cautious concerning the idea of the truth value change: it is rather that, de-
pending on context and shifting standards for knowledge attributions, “S 
knows that p” and “S does not know that p” may be both true, but in diffe-
rent contexts, depending on different standards and in respect to different 
truth conditions. Yet, we think that it makes no essential difference: if Ksp 
is true in context C1, and ¬Ksp is true in context C2, then Ksp is not true in 
C2 as well as ¬Ksp is not true in C1. One way or another, the change of the 
truth value of the knowledge claims does occur, following the change of 
the truth conditions and standards for knowledge attributions. Proceeding 
that way, we are then already freely “descending to the object language” 
and “speaking of knowledge” (utilizing Rysiew’s phrasing). We are forced 
to register not only the change of the truth values of epistemic claims, but 
to accept that the fact of the epistemic matter changes as well: if “S knows 
that p” is true in C1, but not true in C2, then S knows that p in C1, but does 
not know that p in C2.
So we would have, as perhaps an “unpleasant consequence”, David 
Lewis’ (1996) version of contextualism. According to it, not only truth 
conditions and truth values of epistemic claims fluctuate in dependence 
of the context, but the knowledge itself comes and goes as the context 
changes from a more relaxed to a stricter one: since “in the strict context 
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of epistemology we know nothing, yet in laxer contexts we know a lot” 
(1996/1999: 421), “it will be inevitable that epistemology must destroy 
knowledge. That is how knowledge is elusive. Examine it, and straightway 
it vanishes.” (1996/1999: 435). Knowledge is, as Lewis then maintained, 
the function of relevant alternatives for p which are properly ignored 
by the knowledge attributor: for example, in more relaxed contexts, the 
knowledge attributor may properly ignore and eliminate the brain-in-a-vat 
alternative; but in the epistemological or skeptical context, the knowledge 
attributor may not ignore the brain-in-a-vat alternative since it is the rele-
vant one. Consequently, in that context the truth conditions of knowledge 
attributions cannot be fulfilled and knowledge becomes impossible: it 
simply vanishes. Or, like in DeRose’s caricature expression of it, “now 
you know it, now you don’t”.
Not all the contextualists would subscribe to this substantive and, at 
the same time, nihilist view (even Lewis (1996) himself in the last para-
graph confessed that these “informal” statements should have been meta-
linguistically phrased). It is, however, a vivid illustration of the ambiguity 
of contextualism concerning the subject’s epistemic position and its role in 
the truth value of knowledge attributions. DeRose (2009: 204–206) rejects 
this “now you know, now you don’t” picture: a contextualist knowledge 
attributor may not say this, given her actual perspective and actual higher 
standards. She may not say that S does not know now (according to the 
actual higher standards) and did know then (before the standards got ra-
ised), because she can cite only actual, not then standards for epistemic 
attributions. But this maneuver appears problematic, since it leaves the 
obvious change in subject’s epistemic position unexplained and does not 
save contextualism from the “now you know, now you don’t” objection. If 
we follow the legitimate factual or realist reading of the relation between 
epistemic claims and exemplified epistemic properties, something obviou-
sly changed and that change should be observable to the same or to several 
knowledge attributors.
After all, both contexts (here: situations at different times) are connec-
ted by the same character of the predicate “knows”, so the difference 
in content could be and should be recognized by the same attributor or 
be communicable between two attributors. This difference could then be 
traced back to some factual change of the epistemic position of the su-
bject. In other words, the attributor A1 could truthfully say to S: “Now, 
after the standards have been raised, you don’t know!”, implying that S, 
before the standards got raised, did know, since her epistemic position 
was dependent on then, more relaxed standards for knowledge ascription. 
Also, in a scenario with two attributors, A1, the present attributor, could 
communicate this to A2, the then attributor, because they share the same 
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linguistic meaning of “knows” and can agree on variations in the contents 
of knowledge attributions occurred after the standards got raised. And A2 
could say, “Yes, S knew that p according to then standards, but now, after 
the standards got raised, S doesn’t know; I mean, I was not wrong in as-
cribing her knowledge then, since the standards then were not that high 
as now!”
In this particular case DeRose (2009: 185–225) appears as he himself 
“semantically descended” to applying a more substantive or objective-lan-
guage term “counts as knowing”, used by him as an equivalent for “it can 
be truthfully said that the subject ‘knows’“. So, according to DeRose,
“S counts as knowing that p in C”
is, therefore, a simplified translation for
‘“S knows that p” is true in C’.
Obviously, assuming the purely semantic or meta-linguistic character of 
contextualism, this is not defendable: counting or considering S as know-
ing amounts to the direct attribution of knowledge to S. This is not just 
asserting the truthfulness of the knowledge claim “S knows that p”. Or, 
to put it differently, the first one is ascription de re, the latter de dicto. In 
our reading the latter implies the first, but this reading does not hold if 
we confine the scope of contextualism to semantic considerations and are 
careful not to cause the level confusion. Yet, DeRose tried to vindicate this 
phrase as an “expository short-cut”, along the lines Lewis was supposed 
to do so, according to DeRose’s interpretation, when using his metaphor 
“elusive knowledge”.
In the introduction to his The Case for Contextualism (2009: 19) De-
Rose described the content of the first volume as “an exercise in the philo-
sophy of epistemological language”, thus describing his present position 
more acutely. He, however, also clearly announced “a larger role” for 
“substantive epistemology” in the second volume (still to be published). 
In the same vein J. Schaffer (2006: 87) in his contextualist rejoinder to 
subjective-sensitive invariantist arguments put emphasize on the “irrele-
vance of the subject”, meaning that the subject’s stakes are not important 
for her epistemic position. He, however, clearly manifested the substan-
tive talk: “The knowledge relation is sensitive to what is in question for 
the attributor, rather than what is at stake for the subject. There is no sub-
stitute for the contextualist semantics.“ (our emphasis)
Obviously, contextualism is not just a semantic or meta-linguistic 
theory of knowledge attributions, but a theory of knowledge as well. On 
DeRose and other contextualists then lies the burden of showing how this 
substantive move, “semantic descent”, could be made in the framework 
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of meta-linguistically confined contextualist analysis, which dominantly 
develops in the direction of “semantic ascent”.
Summing up, we can preliminary conclude that the contextualist pro-
gram and methodology provoke the need for an alternative approach: the 
alleged, but not purely semantic character of contextualism and the ambi-
guous evidence of contextualist thought-experiments make the truth-ori-
ented or intellectualist invariantist alternative a more plausible and more 
coherent view. Another point of invariantist dissatisfaction would be con-
textualists’ seeking the evidence for their arguments in the “ordinary lan-
guage basis”. Indeed, why would one prefer ordinary language speakers 
as reliable or at least relevant knowledge attributors? Why think that these 
ordinary language epistemic claims are indicative of the epistemic positi-
ons of subjects and of knowledge at all? And why think that “knowledge”, 
albeit indexical like “I” or “now”, or gradable like comparative adjectives 
“tall” or “rich”, is open to various, equivalently vindicated uses? The fact 
that people in their ordinary situations use “knows” differently does not 
justify our concessions to all their uses. In short, we think that the proper 
basis for deciding whether “knows” is indexical, or whether knowledge 
attributions are context sensitive, and if they are context sensitive, how 
they are sensitive, lies in a more stringent framework. This framework is 
provided in the substantive epistemological and psychological research on 
truth-conducive elements of knowledge, as our considerations in the next 
section suggest.
III. Inferential knowledge attributions 
and the psychology of reasoning
Our opting for the truth-oriented invariantism is primarily due to the “in-
tuition” that the shift of the truth conditions of epistemic claims, their 
truth values and, finally, the change of the epistemic position of the sub-
ject, depends on and is sensitive to the cognitive equipment, environment 
or history of the subject in question. Accordingly, the subject’s epistemic 
position is not a matter of pragmatic or interest relative features of the 
situation in which some knowledge attributor is situated (like Mary and 
John in the Airport Case, or Sarah in the revised Bank Case), but pri-
marily of the truth-conducive or truth-preserving processes or procedures 
which caused or grounded her beliefs. Yet, what is epistemically important 
may also be pragmatically important in a subject’s life situation. How-
ever, this pragmatic importance depends on the factors which conduce or 
preserve the truth in the process of acquiring or justifying her belief, and 
not vice versa. Many cases of propositional knowledge discussed from a 
subject-sensitive invariantist perspective, endorsed notably by F. Dretske 
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(2000), or J. Stanley (2005), however, illustrate this “pragmatic dimen-
sion” of knowing. Nevertheless, what proves more fundamental are the 
aforementioned truth-generating or truth-preserving processes. Therefore, 
even in the cases where pragmatic features of the subject’s environment 
essentially influence the epistemic position of the subject, this fact is due 
primarily to her ability to produce relevant true beliefs.
Instead of the idea of interest-relativity, we adopt the idea, formulated 
and advanced by A. I. Goldman (1986, 1992, 2012) in various settings, 
from the individual to social epistemological considerations, that the epi-
stemic position of a subject depends primarily (or exclusively) on her 
chances to achieve or produce true beliefs. Here, veritism, broadly con-
ceived, is favored to pragmatism, since the truth is epistemically prior to 
interests. The reason is simple: for the realization of her own interests one 
necessarily relies on having true or at least empirically adequate beliefs, 
which could amount to the knowledge of facts. Otherwise, when the op-
posite scenario would hold, in which the epistemic position of a subject 
would be a matter of “what is at stake”, not only the truth and knowledge 
would be in danger, but the fulfillment of her interests, too. In such a 
scenario either (i) the practical importance of a situation could (wrongly) 
deprave the subject of her knowledge, which she, in fact, has, or, (ii) the 
relative practical unimportance of someone’s belief could turn her actual 
ignorance into knowledge. Both alternatives lead to disastrous epistemic 
and pragmatic consequences as well.
The truth, truth-conducing and truth-preserving procedures and pro-
cesses are usually associated with reasoning and inferences. In epistemo-
logical terms, reasoning and inference yield inferential justification, which 
in turn can give inferential knowledge. An item of knowledge is inferen-
tial because the justification in question or the pertinent belief-producing 
process is inferential: S believes truly that q on the basis of S’s belief that 
p, where p is a set of premises explicitly entertained by S as her reasons 
for her belief that q. Inferential knowledge is, however, not necessarily 
derivative in this sense, since its justification element does not have to be 
internally accessible to S, or S is not necessarily aware of the quality of 
her premises and the validity of their inferential relations. The fact that a 
reasoning process is (conditionally) reliable does not have to be internally 
accessible to S in order to have an inferentially justified belief and inferen-
tial knowledge. This is the point we owe primarily to A. I. Goldman (1979, 
1986) as a paradigm example of the reliabilist analysis of knowledge.
This approach is, however, comparable with the aforementioned in-
tellectualist brand of contextualism. According to the intellectualist con-
textualist, as presented by DeRose (2009: 188–190), whether S may be 
credited with knowledge depends on how the attributor assesses the truth-
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related factors, like the reliability of belief-forming processes at S’s dis-
posal, or the sensitivity of her beliefs. This parallelism is also manifest 
in the contextualist main cases. For example, when assessing their own 
epistemic status as the state of knowledge or ignorance, Mary and John in 
the Airport Case do not base their epistemic judgment on their stakes. We 
are inclined to say that the pragmatic elements in their situation only trig-
ger more fundamental considerations, those about the reliability of their 
evidential sources (Mary and John ask: “How reliable is that itinerary?”) 
and their procedures (“They decide to check with the airline agent”). Si-
milarly, in various versions of the Bank Case attributors’ higher stakes 
caused the revisions of their initial knowledge claims. Yet, their epistemic 
judgments in the low as well as in the high stakes contexts were based on 
attributor’s assessments of how reliable the subjects were in picking rele-
vant information and in forming true beliefs, or how sensitive their beliefs 
were, about the bank working hours (“I’d better go in and make sure”, as 
has been said by the husband, the first-person knowledge attributor; cf. 
DeRose 2009: 2).
This point is also expressed, ambiguously, but explicitly by DeRose 
(2009: 188):
For the contextualist, exactly which proposition gets expressed by a knowl-
edge-ascribing sentence will often be affected by ‘practical’ factors, but the 
particular proposition that does get expressed will not itself be at all about 
those factors: Whether that proposition is true is determined only by the 
subject’s attitude and the truth-relevant factors of the subject’s situation. 
(our emphasis)
We understand this point, however, as provoking the need for the subject-
sensitive assessment of the truth relevant factors. According to DeRose, 
these factors are operative in “the subject’s situation”. After all, whether 
knowledge claims are true or not depends on them as well as on “the sub-
ject’s attitude”.
The following point made by DeRose’s (2009: 188) discloses the am-
biguity of his position even more:
The contextualist does not hold that whether a subject knows or not can 
depend on non-truth-relevant factors; he holds that whether a speaker can 
truthfully describe the subject as ‘knowing’– whether, in our sense, the sub-
ject ‘counts as knowing’ in the speaker’s context– can depend on such fac-
tors. Whether the speaker can truthfully describe the subject as ‘knowing’ 
can depend on such factors, according to the contextualist, because such 
factors can affect the precise content of the speaker’s claim, not because they 
can affect whether the subject is such as to make true the proposition that the 
speaker is asserting about her.
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Here, obviously, DeRose maintains that the pragmatic elements can affect 
the content (i.e. the proposition) expressed by a knowledge ascribing sen-
tence, and consequently, the truth conditions as well as truth values of the 
respective knowledge ascribing sentence. But we would rejoin: a knowl-
edge ascribing sentence is true because the proposition expressed by it is 
true, and that proposition is true, as DeRose himself says, because of the 
truth-relevant factors operative in the subject’s situation. Consequently, 
whether the knowledge claims are true or not is entirely dependent on the 
subject’s situation, not on variable contexts of knowledge attribution.
Let us assume then that what contextualists, and, particularly intellec-
tualist contextualists say about knowledge attributions is pertinent to the 
ascriptions of inferential knowledge as well.2 We focus on the general pro-
blem of knowledge attributions, in the framework of which the problem 
of the inferential knowledge attributions is supposed to be just a special 
instance of it. When the emphasis is on the inferential knowledge attributi-
ons, the way the pertinent inference confers the warrant/justification to the 
conclusion believed is crucial for the epistemic assessment of the belief 
in the conclusion. Therefore, the attribution of inferential knowledge and 
any theory of it must pay attention to inferential or reasoning standards, by 
which inferential justification and knowledge are assessed. The inferential 
knowledge attributions are correlated with the strength of S’s epistemic 
position with respect to q, which is inferred from p. As it has been shown 
concerning the contextualist cases (Airport Case, Bank Case), S’s episte-
mic position with respect to p depends on (the assessments of) the relia-
bility of the pertinent belief forming process or of the sensitivity of belief 
that p. Analogously, the (assessed) validity or the cogency of inferential 
processes from p to q, as pertinent belief-forming processes, should prove 
decisive for S’s epistemic position with respect to q.
From our perspective, therefore, inferential standards prove consti-
tutive for, and actually function as, epistemic standards: whether the epi-
stemic subject may be credited with inferential knowledge depends on 
the quality (validity, cogency) of her reasoning assessed by inferential 
standards. According to contextualism, for sure, the truth conditions of 
2 When doing so, we neglect the notorious epistemological problems related to the 
role of deductive or probabilistic inference in structuring knowledge, like the Epistemic 
Closure, the Gettier problem or the Lottery Paradox to mention the central ones. Signifi-
cant attention has been paid to these problems among contextualists, for example, by S. 
Cohen (1998) D. Lewis (1996) and M. Heller (1999), as well as among subject-sensitive 
invariantists, by F. Dretske (1970, 1971, 2005) or J. Hawthorne (2004). However, these 
problems primarily arise when one poses substantive questions on the structure of infer-
ential justification and knowledge. And it is still not clear whether the contextualism vs. 
invariantism controversy is particularly relevant for their solutions.
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the sentences of the type “S knows (inferentially) that q” vary with the 
contexts in which attribution of inferential knowledge is made and accor-
ding to its standards, and not with the contexts of the person who draws 
the inferences and comes to know that q inferentially. Yet, the norms of 
respective “conversational contexts”, which govern the use of inferential 
knowledge claims, simply cannot avoid the reference to the standards of 
logic and probability calculus, dominantly deemed as invariant in a re-
levant sense. As it seems, the invariability of these standards should be 
accepted by contextualists, too. And if it is so, then their invariant episte-
mic roles pose significant difficulties for contextualists.
Accordingly, the massive empirical evidence coming from cognitive 
psychology’s subfield psychology of reasoning, as it seems, is not favo-
rable to contextualism. This evidence contains research data concerning 
the reasoning performances of individuals in various types of situations. 
The works of P. Wason (1966), P. Wason and P. Johnson-Laird (1971), 
D. Kahneman, P. Slovic and A. Tversky (1982), A. Tversky and D. Kah-
neman (1984/2002), J. Holland, K. Holyoak, R. Nisbett and P. Thagard 
(1986) and many others collected and systematized experimental data in 
the span of several decades. These empirical results have already been 
utilized extensively in philosophical discussions on human rationality and 
reasoning capacities as well as in epistemological and meta-epistemolo-
gical considerations on the nature of inferential knowledge and the pro-
per philosophical methodology: notable examples include A. I. Goldman 
(1986, 2012), H. Kornblith (1993), S. Stich (1990), to mention just a few. 
We believe that these empirical results and their evaluations are highly 
relevant for discussing the status of knowledge claims and the epistemic 
position of the subject as well. The way the reasoning performances of 
“real people” are evaluated and the way their outcomes – the pieces of 
inferential knowledge or inferential ignorance – are attributed to the rea-
soning subjects may prove illuminative when one comes to the question 
of the truth conditions and the truth values of the knowledge claims of the 
form “S knows inferentially that q”.
Cognitive psychologists demonstrated that people in various contexts 
mostly do not reason according to logical or probabilistic rules, but accor-
ding to other standards, the reliance on which leads to systematic logical 
or probabilistic errors. D. Kahneman, A. Tversky and others identified 
certain heuristics, some other authors from the field suggested that people 
in fact follow different reasoning rules they called pragmatic reasoning 
schemas (J. Holland, K. Holyoak, R. E. Nisbett and P. Thagard 1986) or 
domain specific rules (L. Cosmides 1989) or mental models (P. Johnson-
Laird and R. Byrne 1991). However, independent of the strategies actually 
applied in everyday or expert reasoning practice, the general point which 
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can be made and actually has been made on the basis of the psychological 
research in the domain of the psychology of reasoning is that reasoning 
subjects, in a wide range from lay to expert contexts, make inferential and 
probabilistic fallacies with respect to contextually invariant standards, 
or, at least, the standards which are treated as invariant from a particular 
expert point of view. They are not always the standards which subjects in 
fact follow, but the standards by means of which their cognitive perfor-
mances are relevantly assessed. How otherwise could their performances 
be assessed as “fallacious” or as leading to “systematic errors”, as psyc-
hologists often emphasize?
These psychological findings concerning human reasoning perfor-
mance undermine contextualism, at least, indirectly. Obviously, individual 
reasoners frequently do make fallacies according to invariant inferential 
(deductive or probabilistic) standards, and therefore fail to gain inferential 
knowledge, but not because knowledge attributors in those cases change 
their standards. As those findings indicate, the standards did not shift, but 
certain variations in subject contexts, like domain specificity of reasoning 
cases or the influence of pragmatic features, essentially influenced their 
inferential performances.
The assessment of inferential performance, and its result, inferentially 
produced beliefs, has to rely on invariant standards by means of which it is 
established what the correct inference is. For an invariant normative level 
determines or confines the phenomenon which is the object of investiga-
tion at the descriptive level. Without a general idea about what correct in-
ference is we would hardly define what in general (any) inference is. Also, 
studying the way reasoners actually reason is not possible if one does not 
have an answer how reasoners should reason.
Our point here is that the truth conditions of the claims attributing or 
denying inferential knowledge similarly depend on invariant standards, 
which involve inferential or probabilistic rules as their essential part as 
well. So, when trying to explain why the sentence “S knows inferentially 
that q” may vary and be true in the context C1, but false in the context C2, 
we treat the contexts C1 and C2 as the contexts in which S comes to believe 
that q and makes some inference from p to q according to some inferential 
rules, not the contexts in which knowledge claims are made. The variations 
in S’s overall epistemic position are explained as the function of the facts 
in her context, and not in the context in which her position is assessed. Or, 
to put it in another way, the fact that S knows that q in some overall situa-
tion or context C1, but fails to know that q in a different overall situation or 
context C2, is not a consequence of the changing standards for knowledge 
attribution– since they do not change or their change is not relevant – but 
of the changing facts about her cognitive performance or epistemic envi-
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ronment. Consequently, it is proved that the variable truth conditions and 
truth values of knowledge claims are sensitive to the changing facts in the 
subject context. We find compelling reasons against contextualism in that 
empirical realm. In that way we do not only question their semantic and 
pragmatic theses, but at the same time contrast their intuitional and lingu-
ist methodology oriented on collecting “data” from contextualist thought-
experiments, with the pieces of genuine empirical evidence.
In order to “test” contextualism in the realm of inferential knowledge, 
let us first consider two typical and widely discussed cases of formally 
incorrect reasoning, described in psychological literature. The first is the 
case of reasoning in the framework of famous Wason’s selection task, 
presented in numerous versions by P. Wason, P. N. Johnson-Laird, R. E. 
Nisbett and others to show how logically untrained people are biased to 
make mistakes in conditional reasoning. The second is the paradigmatic 
case of erroneous probabilistic reasoning, the conjunction fallacy, repor-
ted by D. Kahneman, A. Tversky and others.
1. Selection task
In the original version of the selection task, four cards are presented to 
subjects.
 E   K   4   7
Every card has on its uppermost face a single symbol. Subjects knew 
that on one side of each card is a letter, and on the other a number, accor-
ding to a rule. Then the conditional was presented:
If a card has a vowel on one side, than it has an even number on the 
other side.
Subjects had to select which cards are to be turned over in order to estab-
lish whether the conditional is true or false. The correct selection was the 
E card (which must reveal an even number on the back if the rule is true) 
and the 7 card (which must not reveal a vowel on the back). This combi-
nation, a vowel on the one side and an odd number on the back, renders 
the case which corresponds to the case when the antecedent is true and the 
consequence is false; and this is the only case in which this conditional is 
false, according to the truth table for conditionals.
When we express the reasoning they should have performed or the re-
asoning a competent subject or the inferential knowledge attributor would 
perform, in order to test the rule, we get, roughly, the following conditio-
nal reasoning schema:
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If a card has a vowel on the one side, then it has an even number on 
the other side.
(p → q) 
It is not the case that, if a card has a vowel on the side, then it has 
an even number on the other side if and only if the card has an odd 
number on the one side and a vowel on the other side. 
¬ (p → q) ↔ (p ¬q)
When negative evidence occurs (when it happens that the card has vowel 
on the one side and the odd number on the other), it conclusively discon-
firms the rule, so we have an instance of modus tollens:
(((p→q) → ¬(p ¬q))  (p ¬q)) →¬(p → q).
The reasoning subject must predict the behavior of the cards according to 
the truth-table for material conditional. So, this correlation between the 
different values of the antecedent and consequent on the one hand and the 
factual relations of cards on the other make this task a problem in the real 
world: the logical relation functions as a clue for discovery of a real world 
(albeit local) regularity. Accordingly, the insight in those formal relations 
is a necessary justificational element in the knowledge of these factual 
relations. Initially posed as a formal test of whether people do reason cor-
rectly, the selection task is also a test of the ability of people to gain infer-
ential knowledge of the fact or content covered by this rule.
An insignificantly small number of subjects in the original and su-
bsequent experiments selected the right cards, not more than 20%. The 
majority of subjects turned the E card or the E and 4 cards, which de-
monstrates the pervasiveness of the confirmation bias, i.e. the tendency to 
seek primarily positive evidence and verification instead of falsification. 
Similar results followed in other such, relatively formalized and non-con-
textualized versions of the task, when the cards had (i) other combinations 
of vowels and numbers, (ii) circles on one side and blank surfaces on the 
other sides, etc.
The situation changed when the contexts of examination and the ana-
logical selection tasks became more familiar and less formal, closer to 
subjects’ everyday situations, e.g. when the material conditional has been 
shaped as a rule for socially proper conduct or social contract. So, if we, 
instead of semantically poor tasks with numerals and letters, or geometri-
cal figures, formulate a task which refers to some social rules, like
If a person is drinking beer, then the person must be over 18.
or to a kind of social obligation, like
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If you take my car, you should fill up the tank,
then, what is called “the content effect” (P. Johnson-Laird and R. Byrne 
1991: 73) or “the framing effect” influences conditional reasoning: it 
became more successful with respect to the conclusions drawn. In such 
contexts subjects reached the right conclusions and produced true beliefs 
about what cards are to be drawn in order to test the rule to a much greater 
extent. For example, in the permission schema the task was to test the 
rule that, if a person is drinking beer then the person must be over 18, the 
falsifying case was the combination “the person is drinking beer” and “the 
person is not over 18” cards.
An influential explanation of the content effect has been proposed by 
P. Cheng and K. Holyoak (1985/2008: 829) in terms of “pragmatic reaso-
ning schemas”:
We propose that people often reason using neither syntactic, context-free 
rules of inference, nor memory of specific experiences. Rather, they reason 
using abstract knowledge structures induced from ordinary life experiences, 
such as “permissions,” “obligations,” and “causations.” Such knowledge 
structures are termed pragmatic reasoning schemas. A pragmatic reasoning 
schema consists of a set of generalized, context sensitive rules which, un-
like purely syntactic rules, are defined in terms of classes of goals (such as 
taking desirable actions or making predictions about possible future events) 
and relationships to these goals (such as cause and effect or precondition and 
allowable action).
Our theoretical framework assumes that the role of prior experience in fa-
cilitation is in the induction and evocation of certain types of schemas. Not 
all schemas are facilitating, as becomes clear below. Some schemas lead to 
responses that correspond more closely than others with those that follow 
from the material conditional in formal logic. Performance as evaluated by 
the standard of formal logic depends on what type of schema is evoked, or 
whether any schema is evoked at all.
We find this explanation by Cheng and Holyoak strikingly relevant for our 
previous considerations on the context sensitivity of knowledge claims. 
It is clear that Cheng and Holyoak see reasoning performances as prag-
matically and contextually conditioned by the reasoner’s use of pragmatic 
reasoning schemas as “context sensitive rules” defined in respect to certain 
pragmatic “goals”, i.e. to “what is at stake” in subject context. By using 
proper reasoning schemas subjects reached better inferential results, i.e., 
they reproduced more frequently a reasoning schema which corresponds 
to material conditional in formal logic. On the other hand, the inference 
failure, and therefore inferential ignorance, in the original, non-contextu-
alized version of the selection task is due to the fact that it did not evoke a 
reasoning schema corresponding to material conditional.
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Obviously, reasoning performances are “evaluated by the standard of 
formal logic”, so the pertinent inferential knowledge or ignorance can be 
claimed only on the background of this authoritative invariant standard. 
We could say, in a slightly rigorist way, that “S knows inferentially that q” 
is true or false according to the context insensitive or invariant standard. It 
means that people gain respective inferential knowledge insofar their re-
asoning structurally corresponds to relevant logical rules, and do not gain 
it insofar they do not reason according to such rules. Pragmatic reasoning 
schemas enable better reasoning results, but only because reasoning per-
formance, statistically, tend to yield formally correct inferences.
As Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett and Thagard (1986) report, in such an 
experiment, 66% of subjects which were confronted with a “permission 
problem” like the previous “drinking age” rule or a similar, contextualized 
version of the task got the right answer versus only 19% of subjects which 
ought to solve an arbitrary and formal problem similar to the original se-
lection task. This experimental fact was reproduced in similar ratios in 
many other experiments.
All these research results confirm our initial assumption that differen-
ces in cognitive performance and, therefore, in the epistemic position of 
the subject are not due to the variations in the relevant attributor context – 
since there are no such variations – but only to the variations in the subject 
context. These variations include different reasoning schemas used by re-
asoners and different pragmatic goals: goals (“what is at stake”) determine 
the choice of the scheme, but the scheme is epistemically successful if it 
follows a standardized norm. Only in this way subjects, proceeding from 
true premises, p1, … pn, non-accidentally or necessarily reach the truth 
and achieve the pertinent inferential knowledge of the consequence q.
Cognitive scientists identified, in fact, various cognitive instruments 
which have a facilitating effect on reasoning in the selection tasks, ran-
ked according to their generality: from deontic logic as the most general 
one, which is proposed by D. Cummins (1996), and pragmatic reasoning 
schemas in terms of permissions or obligations, considered by Cheng and 
Holyoak (1985), over the domain of social exchange and the social con-
tract algorithm by L. Cosmides (1989) to the “checking for cheaters” al-
gorithm as the most concrete one by G. Gigerenzer and K. Hug (1992). 
Different levels, of course, do not have to exclude each other, so in one 
reasoning process the simultaneous activation of several levels is con-
ceivable: deontic logical rules, pragmatic schemas, the kinds of content 
and specific experience. Unlike the theses explaining the content effect in 
Wason’s selection task by the kind of content on which subjects make their 
inferences, D. Sperber, F. Cara and V. Girotto (1995) in the framework of 
their relevance theory explain the same phenomenon without evoking any 
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specific kind of content. The reasoning outcome depends on the reasoning 
context. However, the result is the activation of the general mechanism of 
the linguistic understanding. Information is assessed as relevant when it 
causes a cognitive effect, i.e. leads to forming a new belief or to rejecting 
the current one. A cognitive effect includes processing, which amounts 
to a cognitive effort. When interpreting one’s assertions, a subject tries 
to maximize the relevance, and it means that she accepts that interpreta-
tion which, in particular circumstances, by means of economic cognitive 
effort, yields a sufficient cognitive effect. In the contextualized versions 
of the selection task (e.g. alcohol/age of majority) most of the examinees 
give a correct answer because the context of such tasks, unlike the original 
version, diminishes the cognitive effort of processing and augments the 
cognitive effect of the correct answer.
In spite of significant mutual disagreements, all these explanations 
refer to the subject context, or more general, to the structure of the envi-
ronment. An environment contains elements or information which reaso-
ning subjects judge as relevant for solving a particular problem, so they 
are included in the very process of reasoning and thus influence its out-
come. This is obvious evidence for the thesis that the difference in perfor-
mance of reasoning subjects and in their overall cognitive achievement is 
a matter of the shifts in their cognitive surroundings and the quality of the 
processes of their problem solving. Even if there is no correlation between 
the reasoning success and the intuition people share about logical rules, 
additional information and a richer evidential basis obviously contribute 
to the reasoning success of examinees, or at least, to the right guessing in 
subjects’ everyday situations.
Such an improvement in reasoning outcomes of the subjects is not 
necessarily an indicator of their epistemic improvement, since the expe-
riments show that the subjects sometimes guessed the right solutions 
through unreliable or improper procedures. We are inclined to say that, 
although they achieved better results after the tasks were rephrased, they 
were not in a principally better epistemic position concerning the task and 
its solutions. If we take a strong rigorist and intellectualist invariantist atti-
tude, we would say that, basically, they remained ignorant about the solu-
tion in question. For the acquaintance with the truth table for conditional 
and its right application as well as a competent application of elementary 
reasoning rules, such as modus ponens and modus tollens, are necessary 
conditions for the knowledge of the conclusion. Any right guesswork sim-
ply would not count as knowledge.
But to deny them any epistemic improvement would confront us with 
an obvious change in their performance. Since they give locally correct 
answers, i.e. right solutions to informal problems, and not to purely formal 
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logical problems, they have a kind of local “knowledge” according to the 
conditions in the subject’s environment. Even when subjects reason in 
a formally correct way, logic does not determine which of the infinitely 
many valid inferences they will perform in a particular case. This is de-
termined by the pragmatic features of the situation. Logic discerns valid 
from invalid inferences, but particular circumstances determine which va-
lid inferences, among infinitely many possible valid inferences, are useful 
or relevant in these circumstances. So the epistemic improvement, as well 
as the epistemic degradation, is in that sense a matter of pragmatic or situ-
ational factors operating on the fixed normative background.
Contextualists would say that whether the subjects know, or in me-
talinguistic phrasing, whether “S knows that q” is true, in such situations 
depends on the contextually variable attributor standard applied when the 
results are assessed. The measuring standard applied here is normatively 
fixed: it is connected to indicative conditionals and classical bivalent pro-
positional logic. It is not any of the standards which the examinees perhaps 
implicitly applied, e.g. heuristic principles or some other contextually or 
domain specific reasoning schemas. For only by means of such an inva-
riant standard could reasoning fallacies or improvements get detected. In 
fact, empirical research was designed in a way to check whether logical 
laws, which constitute one of the standards of inferential knowledge, hold 
in practice as reasoning rules. The negative results were interpreted as 
a deviation from them. Cognitive psychologists tried to establish and to 
explain the nature of the relation between inferential practice and logical 
rules. Cognitive shortcuts used in reasoning, environmental conditions of 
their successfulness, kinds of content which have a facilitating or obstruc-
ting effect on reasoning – all these phenomena have been detected and 
assessed only by referring to the invariant standard of the logical norm. 
This is strongly indicated by the convergence of results toward the same 
value in various contexts as well as by their parallel “improvement” when 
the tasks got conveniently contextualized.
In order to illustrate it, we may apply the contextualist strategy and 
the idea that “knows” in different contexts of examination means diffe-
rent things. Suppose that there are two groups of examinees, one which 
is formed by the graduates in class A, in the philosophical department 
where a kind of mystical existentialism is favored, and the other, formed 
by the graduates which are trained in logic and are familiar with formal 
epistemological problems (like brain-in-a-vat); they are in class B. The 
task to be solved is the original selection task. Students are also required 
to explain their conclusions, but the criteria for this explanation are hi-
gher in class B, than in class A: the first should refer to the truth table for 
material implication, the second should give any explanation whatsoever. 
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However, a student S from class B happens to solve the task among the 
members of class A. After checking the results, the teachers notice the 
mistake and her test is now together with the tests of her colleagues in 
class B. At first, they assessed her result as correct in the given margin for 
class A: she has chosen the right combination of cards, but explained her 
choice by referring to the application of some inappropriate formal rule 
and to the truth table for, say, material biconditional, and not by referring 
to the complete truth table for material conditional and to modus ponens 
and modus tollens. When assessed among the tests from class B, S’s result 
is not so satisfactory any more: her explanation is not good enough for 
those teachers. Did S know in the first case, when her test was checked in 
the context in which standards for the class A were operative, but did not 
know when they were checked according to the criteria for the class B? 
Or, in other words, is the epistemic claim “S knows that q” [i.e. the right 
combination of the cards] when uttered in the first context true, and, when 
uttered in the second context, false?
If this is the case, shall we say, then, that “knows” in both contexts 
denotes different epistemic properties, so that in the first case, in order to 
reach the right answers and acquire knowledge, one must meet lower stan-
dards, and that in the second one must satisfy higher standards? Hardly! 
In both contexts, even if the teachers of both groups applied different epi-
stemic norms/criteria, we would expect the same performance in order to 
ascribe to S the reasoning success without the danger of systematic error 
and in order to attribute to S knowledge about the conclusions drawn: the 
same cards should have been picked up according to a single logical stan-
dard. Pure guesswork would not have worked: only the knowledge of the 
truth table and valid reasoning schemas would have given the knowledge 
of the conclusion (given enough relevant information), making the claim 
“S knows that q” is true.
Consider the previous case, but in the version in which the epistemic 
position of the subject is correlated with the pragmatic features of the 
attributor’s situation. For example, imagine that S has a true belief that 
q, about which cards are to be turned over, yet reached by a wrong infe-
rence rule, and that A, some attributor, is to lose ten cents for her wrong 
answer: Is the attributor’s claim “S knows that q” then true? Also, imagine 
some other context, in which the attributor could lose a million euros for 
S’s wrong answer, and S has an inferentially justified true belief that q, 
immune to Gettier counter examples: Is the claim “S knows that q” false 
because of the stakes in the attributor’s context? It is hard to see why the 
respective knowledge claim in the first case would be true and in the se-
cond false. In both cases the measuring standard and the normative expec-
tations concerning the result stay the same, even when there are some 
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differences in respect to what is at stake for the attributor. In both cases S 
would be right or wrong and she would know or would not know which 
cards are to be turned over irrespectively of the stakes. So, when all factors 
are doing their truth-conducive job properly, “S knows that q” is true, and 
when these factors are not truth-conducive, “S knows that q” is false, no 
matter what is at stake for the attributor.
2. The conjunction fallacy
One could find previous considerations on the status of knowledge claims 
in the framework of deductive reasoning and respective inferential knowl-
edge perhaps not so persuasive or interesting, since the cases of inferential 
knowledge or ignorance based on deductive inference are not just cases 
of factual knowledge or ignorance, but primary of logical knowledge, or 
knowledge of logical connectives and relations. We find this complaint 
unjustified, since in all versions of the selection task the knowledge of 
the logical rules or relations was only instrumental in discovering factual 
regularities. Nevertheless, this complaint would perhaps not be issued to 
the following considerations on the probabilistic reasoning and inductive 
inferences, since they produce beliefs whose factual content is undisput-
able, although similarly dependent on other type of formal rules, i.e. the 
rules of the probability calculus.
In many everyday situations probabilistic inferences we draw are, 
however, not a result of the application of the standard norm, i.e. the pro-
bability calculus. In everyday circumstances one often lacks the time or 
information, or numeric values required for the application of the norm. 
In the real process of probabilistic reasoning, therefore, instead of very 
complex calculations prescribed by the norm, people use cognitive short-
cuts, so-called heuristics. By means of them they reduce the extension of 
the problem, thus making the probability judgment simpler. For example, 
the availability or associative distance is a heuristic in which subjects, 
when judging the probability, rely on several strategies of “providing” the 
information assessed by them as relevant for solving the problem: when 
reasoning about new features in the situations subjects usually retrieve 
familiar features from the memory. Anchoring and adjustment present the 
dependence of the assessment of some quantity on a previously available 
quantity, and the heuristic of representativeness applies to various infe-
rential strategies in which the probability of an outcome is judged on the 
basis of the degree to which it resembles the essential properties of the 
evidence. For resemblance is, unlike the probability, an easily available 
and easily assessable value.
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In ordinary circumstances relying on heuristics mostly leads to suf-
ficiently good results: it is easier to recollect those events, which in or-
dinary circumstances are indeed more frequent; it is easier to imagine or 
to construe events which are more likely to happen, and associative links 
strengthen when two types of events frequently happen together. In all 
these cases inference to the frequency, likeliness and correlation by means 
of the heuristic of availability may be successful. The effect of anchoring 
is correlated with cognitive economy, and the heuristic of representative-
ness is defendable by the fact that in many circumstances more probable 
events are more representative than those less probable. However, since 
heuristics are to a great extent based on accidental and subjective factors 
in the contexts of reasoning, they may result in systematic fallacies, so-
called biases. For example, the heuristic of representativeness results in 
expectations that any two samples picked out from the same population 
resemble each other and the population more than it is predicted by the 
sample theory, namely, it is expected that any segment reflects the real 
proportion (so-called local representativeness) and that a random process 
is auto-corrective.
In the preface to a retrospectively composed collection of essays de-
voted to the discovery of “heuristics and biases”, which according to the 
authors actually govern people’s reasoning, the editors T. Gilovich and D. 
Griffin emphasized the contextual and situational relativity of people’s 
reasoning performance. At the same time, they restated the obviously en-
trenched and widespread invariantism concerning the standards to which 
this performance has been assessed:
The core idea of the heuristic and biases program is that judgment under un-
certainty is often based on a limited number of simplifying heuristics rather 
than more formal and extensive algorithmic processing. These heuristics 
typically yield accurate judgments, but can give rise to systematic error. (T. 
Gilovich and D. Griffin 2002: xv) (our emphasis)
A. Tversky and D. Kahneman (1984/2002) in their study on extensional 
versus intuitive reasoning again forcefully express the same idea:
The presence of bias and incoherence does not diminish the normative force 
of these principles, but it reduces their usefulness as descriptions of behavior 
and hinders their prescriptive applications (A. Tversky and D. Kahneman 
2002: 48) (our emphasis)
The contingent and pragmatically justified “accuracy” of these heuristics 
obviously cannot obscure the fact that they, when the context and content 
of reasoning are changed, and it may always happen, lead to a “system-
atic error”. And, although the cognitive standard is not descriptively and 
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prescriptively useful, it obviously stays as an invariant evaluative stand-
ard for the attribution of inferential knowledge in this domain. Obviously 
again, the differences in cognitive successfulness are due to the changes 
in cognitive environment or in the subject context, while the attributor’s 
standard remains the same.
A paradigm case of the “judgment under uncertainty” is the so-called 
conjunction fallacy, which illustrates how the content and context influ-
ence reasoning results. Consider the famous case:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, very bright, majored in phi-
losophy, interested in social and moral issues, active in anti-nuclear move-
ment. So, we have the following descriptions of her:
1. L. is a teacher in elementary school. 
2. L. works in a bookstore and takes Yoga classes. 
3. L. is active in the feminist movement. (f) 
4. L. is a psychiatric social worker. 
5. L. is a member of the League of Women Voters. 
6. L. is a bank teller. (t) 
7. L. is an insurance salesperson. 
8. L. is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. (f&t)
The most frequent result (85% of the examinees) was the answer that 8. 
(f&t) is more probable than 6. (t). This answer clearly violates the rule for 
probabilistic inferences that conjunction cannot be more probable than its 
conjuncts. If I = background information about Linda, f = Linda is active 
in the feminist movement, and t = Linda is a bank teller, then their errone-
ous inference in question goes in the following way:
Given I, P(f) >P(t) 
Therefore, P(f&t)>P(t).
The conjunction fallacy is caused by the fact that the logic of representa-
tiveness differs from the logic of the probability calculus: additional ele-
ments in a description may increase the representativeness of an event 
or its resemblance to a stereotype, however, without increasing its prob-
ability. In short, although it cannot be more probable, conjunction may be 
more representative than any of its conjuncts. So, in such circumstances, 
the assessment of probability based on the heuristics of representativeness 
leads directly to the conjunction fallacy.
How to interpret this empirical fact of the pervasive erroneous rea-
soning and inferential ignorance in the light of contextualist strategy of 
explaining the truth value of knowledge claims in dependence of the attri-
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butor context? Taking semantic and pragmatic theses as contextualist star-
ting points, two procedures are available: (1) to stratify the meaning of the 
pertinent “knows” concerning the proposition “P(f&t) > P(t)” in relation 
to various conversational contexts, from the lay to the expert ones, and (2) 
to vary the epistemic standards which govern knowledge attributions in 
those various contexts according to “what is at stake” for the attributors.
However, as in the previous case of conditional reasoning, there is 
not much space for contextualist maneuvers. Since contextualism is fo-
cused on the cases in which no shift in subject contexts is detected, but 
only supposed shifts in epistemic standards for knowledge attributions or 
denials, contextualism simply cannot give the right explanations for such 
cases. Indeed, the first strategy may yield certain results: examinees, when 
examined on or checked for their linguistic understanding of the predicate 
“(probabilistically) knows”, would possibly apply all those different he-
uristics and manifest different “contents”; they would perhaps show that 
what they understand by it has something of their implicit mixing up the 
probability with representativeness, anchoring or some other “biased” stra-
tegy of reaching probabilistic conclusions. Therefore, any derived content 
of the predicate “(probabilistically) knows” would be surely contextually 
dependent. However, it could not count as relevant or adequate, since it 
would not be in accordance with the relevant invariant standard. The con-
textualist strategy is simply not so persuasive here as in the context of 
ordinary language considerations. Obviously, the point is extra-linguist in 
character: the truth values of the inferential knowledge attributions do not 
depend on any of the “lay” intuitions about the content of the relevant epi-
stemic predicate. An analogous point holds for the possible strategy (2): 
the psychological examiners or, in that domain, knowledge attributors (as 
they were supposed to) had no practical interests concerning the quality 
of examinees’ solutions in the case of the conjunction fallacy and in other 
similar cases. There was just nothing at stake for them.
Conclusion
Logical and probabilistic rules make invariant standards for the attribu-
tion of reasoning competence and respective inferential knowledge, as is 
abundantly confirmed by the experimental findings and their relevant in-
terpretations by cognitive scientists. The presence or lack of knowledge 
in different contexts should be then explained by the intrinsic facts about 
the ways people perform their reasoning, i.e. about their current biases, 
cognitive histories or their natural and social environments, and not by 
the shifting standards for knowledge attributions. The standards for the 
inferential knowledge attributions – the epistemic standards of a particular 
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kind – remain the same across the contexts even when practices in differ-
ent contexts may follow some other reasoning patterns (e.g. heuristics, 
domain specific rules or pragmatic reasoning schemas). The variations in 
the truth conditions and truth values of knowledge attributing or denying 
sentences in the cases of correct or fallacious reasoning described in the 
psychological literature were, therefore, sensitive only to the context of 
the reasoning subjects. In a generalized form, this thesis amounts to the 
claim that the attributions of inferential knowledge or ignorance (igno-
rance due to an inferential error) track the changes in the subject’s context, 
given the fixed normative framework.
In the situations in which no shift in epistemic standards could be 
detected, but only shifts in the cognitive performance made by various su-
bjects in various contexts, it seems that contextualism is not explanatorily 
better than invariantism. So, contrary to the contextualist thesis that “the 
truth conditions of knowledge-ascribing and knowledge-denying senten-
ces (…) fluctuate in certain ways according to the context in which they 
are uttered” (DeRose 2002: 168), they fluctuate in dependence on the con-
ditions in variable subject contexts.
This can be further reinforced by empirical findings, which, somew-
hat pessimistically, have already shown that individual subjects make 
fallacies in various contexts, from lay, everyday contexts to the expert 
ones, and that people in various communities and cultures make structu-
rally similar fallacies and similar informal reasoning strategies. However, 
all this indicates the existence and cognitive accessibility (at least, to the 
experts) of invariant inferential and epistemic standards. That makes an 
optimistic argument in favor of invariantism.
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